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Hatch-Waxman Patent Case Settlements—
The Supreme Court Churns the Swamp
Kent Bernard*
I. INTRODUCTION
To lusty cheers of consulting economists and litigating
lawyers everywhere, and the heartfelt groans of everyone
responsible for litigation budgets at pharmaceutical companies,
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 rejected both (a) the
settling parties’ view that any settlement within the scope of
the patent at issue and not the result of sham litigation was
legal;2 and (b) the FTC’s view that any settlement which
involved a transfer of any money or asset from the patent
owner to the challenger was presumptively illegal.3 The Court
chose to open up door (c), and require that there be a full “rule
of reason” inquiry into the settlement.4 Those who were afraid
that the Court might actually settle the law here can breathe
easily again.
In the underlying litigation, Solvay settled infringement
suits with would-be generic producers with a settlement which
let the generics enter on a date certain (before the expiration of
the patent at issue), and with payments to the alleged infringer
in exchange for the performance of certain marketing and
promotional services for Solvay.5 The FTC alleged that these
services had little value and that the payments were really
made to compensate the generics for agreeing to delay their
entry into the market.6

© 2014 Kent Bernard
* Adjunct Professor, Fordham University School of Law, JD 1975
University of Pennsylvania; BA 1972 Colgate University.
1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. Id. at 2237.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2237–38.
5. Id. at 2229.
6. Id. at 2229–30.
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The district court dismissed the FTC’s complaint under the
“scope of the patent” test, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the
patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust
attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”7
Some ninety-five percent of all patent cases are resolved by
settlement before a court judgment.8 Settlements are not only
permitted, but favored. There is not, and rationally cannot be,
any requirement that every case needs to be litigated to the
death. Only someone who has either never litigated, or never
worried about a litigation budget, would suggest a “no
settlements” rule. The question comes down to what limits, if
any, the law imposes on the parties’ freedom to settle the cases.
And does the fact that cases arose under the provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act9 make any difference?
The Supreme Court had essentially four possible ways to
deal with these issues:
A. The Scope of the Patent Test: This was the majority
rule, which held that if the settlement was within the scope of
the patent and the litigation was not sham, the decision of the
parties as to the terms of settlement would be respected.10 This
is the rule applied to patent cases in general, and the question
was whether it should also apply in the somewhat weird world
of Hatch-Waxman (more on this below).
B. The Presumptive Illegality Test: This was the FTC’s
approach, and a slight retreat from its initial position. To the

7. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
8. Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse
Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1048 (2004).
9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). While the statute is usually
cited as encouraging generic drugs, it also attempted to help restore the
patent life lost in the regulatory review process. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857,
pt. 1, at 15 (1984) (describing how Title II of the Act incentivized research and
development through “restoration of some of the time lost on patent life while
the product is awaiting pre-market approval”). The intent was to provide
something for the generics and something for the innovators. That second part
tends to be overlooked.
10. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he patent
holder—when doing anything, including settling—must act within the scope of
the patent.”).
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FTC, a settlement is legal if the patent owner gives up one kind
of property (part of his patent term), but presumptively illegal
if he gives up some other kind of property (such as a cash
payment). The original formulation of the test was that any
payment or transfer of value of any kind (other than giving up
part of the patent tem) was not merely presumptively, but per
se illegal (and the FTC urged Congress to so legislate).11 But
before the Court in Actavis, the FTC scaled back to requesting
only that the settlement be presumed to be illegal and that the
parties could try to justify it12—to the same agency that had
publicly announced many times that such settlements were all
illegal.
C. The Rule of Reason Test: The full, untrammeled rule of
reason inquiry: whether, on balance, the pro-competitive
aspects of the transaction outweigh the anticompetitive
aspects.13 As this is the test that the Court adopted, we will
speak about it in more depth below.
D. Let Congress Fix What Congress Hath Wrought: This
argument is really quite simple. What prompted the whole
situation of odd-looking settlements was the structure that
Congress set up in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Under that statute,
a generic company can take a patented drug, create its own
version, and do the bioequivalence testing necessary to get it
approved, all without being deemed to have infringed the
innovator’s patent.14
11. For example, in the 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses,
Senator Herb Kohl (together with between four and nine co-sponsors from
both parties) introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act. S. 27,
112th Cong. (2011); S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007); S.
3582, 109th Cong. (2006). The proposed bills would have made it unlawful for
a brand-name manufacturer and a generic ANDA filer to enter into any
agreement where “(i) an ANDA filer receives anything of value,” and “(ii) the
ANDA filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell the
ANDA product for any period of time.” E.g., S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
None of the proposed bills passed.
12. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
13. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999)
(“‘[W]hether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual
market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not the
challenged restraint enhances competition.’” (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984))).
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (providing that uses
of patented inventions “reasonably related to development and submission of
information under a Federal Law” related to manufacture and sale of
pharmaceuticals are not acts of infringement).
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Hatch-Waxman set up an artificial act of infringement
(Paragraph IV filing);15 essentially a no-risk way for a generic
to provoke a challenge, putting the patent at issue. As Courts
and commentators have pointed out at length, this skewed the
risk/reward calculus for the parties: The infringer (generic) has
no downside (litigation costs only),16 and a huge potential
upside (it may gain the entire product market—first to file, 180
day exclusivity, and mandatory generic substitution).17 The
innovator has no upside (the best that it can do is preserve
what it has—there are no damages to compromise as a
settlement), and a huge potential downside (lose the whole
product market). And as courts and commentators have
repeatedly recognized, patent litigation is always a risk—there
is a real chance of losing your patent even when you should
win.18
That means that a generic company with a weak or nonexistent case still has an enormous incentive to “infringe” by
making the filing. The unique position that ANDA filers have
in Hatch-Waxman litigation encourages Paragraph IV
certifications, and persistent litigation, even where the generic
has little reason to be confident regarding its prospects on the
merits.19
Given that Congress set up this weird mix of incentives
and disincentives, and given that what is at issue here is the
balance between rewarding innovation and encouraging
generic entry to lower prices, and given that this is an area in
which Congress has chosen to legislate, then why not leave it
up to Congress to fix the mess that it created?
15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
16. Kelly Smith & Jonathan Gleklen, Generic Drugmakers Will Challenge
Patents Even When They Have a 97% Chance of Losing: The FTC Report that
K-Dur Ignored, 9 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2012, at 6, available at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6746 (“[T]aking a
shot at a patent is, if not costless, quite cheap. The only costs of a challenge
are litigation expenses and the cost of regulatory approval.”).
17. In re Tamixofen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir.
2005) (“The incentive . . . may be immense: the profits [a generic] will likely
garner in competing with the patent holder . . . and . . . possible entitlement to
a 180-day period . . . during which it would be the exclusive seller of the
generic drug in the market.”).
18. See, e.g., Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First
Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 617, 627–28 (2005).
19. See generally Smith & Gleklen, supra note 16.
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II. WHAT THE COURT’S DECISION IN ACTAVIS
ACTUALLY DID
We will hear a lot of spinning about who “won” this case,
and indeed both sides can claim the laurel. The FTC “won”
because it gets to bring these challenges. The manufacturers
“won” because the FTC will have to prove a full rule of reason
case without any presumption that payments are illegal.
So let’s look at the decision itself. The majority opinion,
authored by Justice Breyer, held that antitrust challenges to
reverse payment settlement agreements should be analyzed
under the rule of reason.20 The Court recognized that the “scope
of the patent” test was grounded on a strong policy
consideration favoring settlements, and that the rule of reason
would likely reduce the litigating parties’ incentive to settle
patent infringement suits, but agreed with the FTC that “there
is reason for concern” that reverse payment settlements “have
significant adverse effects on competition,” and that the “scope
of the patent” test therefore did not subject such agreements to
a sufficient amount of antitrust scrutiny.21
However, the Court also rejected the FTC’s argument that
reverse payment agreements are presumptively unlawful.22
Since the dissent also rejected the FTC’s argument, one of the
less publicized results of the case is that the “presumption of
illegality” which the FTC has been pushing was rejected by all
the Justices participating in the case.
In making its determination, the Court specifically pointed
to “five sets of considerations,”23 which it summarized as
follows:
[A] reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it
the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a
payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such a firm or
individual may well possess market power derived from the patent;
a court, by examining the size of the payment, may well be able to
assess its likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential
justifications without litigating the validity of the patent; and
parties may well find ways to settle patent disputes without the use
of reverse payments.24

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2237–38.
Id. at 2234–37.
Id. at 2237 (emphasis added).
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Like many majority opinions, this one seems to reflect
compromises and comments necessary to get the majority vote.
Statements that reverse payment settlements in which there
are no actual damages are unusual outside the pharmaceutical
field are disingenuous.
First, we don’t know about most settlements. No law
requires them to be filed with the FTC or made public except in
the Hatch-Waxman drug field.25 Second, cases outside of the
Hatch-Waxman universe are indeed sometimes settled with a
combination of payments and cross-licenses, the net result of
which may be a payment to the alleged infringer (when all the
valuations are done).26 Third, in no field of which the author is
aware, other than Hatch-Waxman cases, do you have a
situation where the norm is that the infringement has not
caused any actual damages at the time of trial. The artificial
trigger of infringement is unique to Hatch-Waxman. Given the
oddity of the statute, some oddities in the settlements could be
foreseen.
The majority opinion raises some fascinating questions:
A. What kinds of settlements are now permissible? The
Court states that it is permissible to negotiate a date certain
for generic entry prior to the patent’s expiration.27 It also states
that cash payments to a generic company may be justified
under certain limited circumstances, such as to compensate for
litigation costs.28 And it is legal to pay fair value for services or
products from the potential infringer.29
B. What kinds of settlements are now at risk? The Court
repeatedly emphasizes that “[a]n unexplained large reverse
payment itself” suggests that the patentee has doubts about
the patent’s strength and survival.30 As the dissent points out,
this is vastly over-simplified. Even someone very confident
about their patent knows that litigation is a risk, and for
someone risk-averse, the payment may be worthwhile to avoid
25. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using
New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
629, 641 (2009) (raising the factual question of how frequently these
settlements occur).
26. Id. (“[H]ow do we know that the payment was made in exchange for
delay, rather than for some other valuable consideration?”).
27. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
28. Id. at 2235.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2236.
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the risk of an erroneous lower court finding against the patent,
even if that finding was likely to be reversed on appeal.31 This
raises three basic questions:
(1) How do we determine what is a “large” payment? The
Court indicates merely that the scale of reverse payments
should be weighed against the brand’s anticipated litigation
costs, the value of any services provided by the generic, and
other justifications raised by the defendants.32 But are these
the only factors? A reverse payment of $1 million may seem
large in the context of a product that sells $10 million per year.
But in the context of a $1 billion product, it would not seem
large at all.
(2) Do we really care if the patentee has “doubts” about the
strength or survival of the patent, or is this a shorthand way of
saying that such a large and unexplained payment suggests
that the patent actually is invalid or not infringed? If the latter,
that shorthand argument runs smack up against the facts of
some of the most famous litigated cases. In the Cipro
litigation,33 Bayer settled the first case with Barr; then
Ranbaxy, Schein, Mylan, and Carlsbad each challenged the
Cipro patent. In each case, Bayer produced the record of the
Barr case. Bayer won all the subsequent cases.34 The reverse
payment certainly did not reflect a weakness in the patent!
(3) What explanations will serve to justify an otherwise
“large” reverse payment? The Court states that the payment
may be an estimate of saved litigation expenses, or “may reflect
compensation for other services that the generic has promised
to perform—such as distributing the patented item or helping
to develop a market for that item.”35

31. Id. at 2244–45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Bernard & Tom,
supra note 18, at 626–27, 622–23. The importance of allowing settlement to
protect against unjustified theft of the innovator’s intellectual property as the
result of an erroneous trial court decision seems to be ignored here.
32. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
33. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323,
1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
34. Ranbaxy withdrew its certification and abandoned the litigation. In
the Schein and Mylan cases, Bayer won on summary judgment and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Carlsbad’s challenge to the patent
was rejected in a bench trial, and it did not appeal. I want to thank counsel for
Bayer for providing me with this information. See also In re Ciprofloxacin, 544
F.3d at 1329.
35. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
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C. Does Actavis require an inquiry into the strength of the
patent at issue in evaluating a settlement? The Court
recognized that if parties were forced to litigate the validity of
the underlying patent to defend against antitrust challenges to
patent settlement agreements, the incentive to settle would be
significantly diminished.36 The Court claimed, however, that
[I]t is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the
antitrust question . . . . An unexplained large reverse payment itself
would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about
the patent’s survival. And that fact, in turn, suggests that the
payment’s objective is to maintain supra-competitive prices to be
shared among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what
might have been a competitive market—the very anticompetitive
consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness.37

What is meant by that “normally” is not clear. Does it
mean that sometimes an “unexplained large reverse payment”
does not suggest anything bad and is not illegal? Or does it
mean that even if there is no payment, there can still be a
violation? If the latter is true, then no settlement on any terms
is safe from attack. One would hope that was not the Court’s
intent.
III. DID THE COURT SLAY A BRONTOSAURUS?
Both the majority and the dissent in Actavis focus on
settlements involving cash payments from the patentee to the
alleged infringer. The only problem is that such cash payments
have become less and less common (even when they were held
to be perfectly legal).
Scott Hemphill has done extensive research as to the facts
of the reverse payment cases, and the results are instructive.38
Since 2005, the clear trend in the cases has been away from
cash payments entirely. The settlements are being based on
side deals, the kinds of “other services” that the Court in
Actavis says may justify the “payment.”39 So, if cash deals are
out of fashion, how do we evaluate whether or not there has
been that “unexplained large reverse payment” that triggers
scrutiny?
36. Id. at 2234, 2237.
37. Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).
38. See Hemphill, supra note 25, at 657–61. Even those of us who disagree
with Scott’s conclusions and prescriptions owe him a debt of thanks for his
work in obtaining and laying out the underlying data.
39. See id. at 649 tbl.2; see also id. at 663–65.
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IV. QUO VADIS?
First, when we evaluate a settlement involving services or
products provided by the alleged infringer, the question cannot
rationally be whether the parties would have done the deal
absent the litigation. Such a test would eviscerate the Court’s
opinion as to legitimacy of fair value deals. If the parties had
wanted to deal with each other apart from the litigation
settlement context, they would have. This is simply another
facet of the Court’s finding that if the transaction is for fair
value, then it should be allowed without regard to the pendency
of the patent infringement case.
In our context, the question has to be: “Notwithstanding
the litigation, does this deal represent a fair value transaction
for both parties?” So, how do we determine fair value? Enter
the economists and consultants. Businesses value products and
services every day, and those values should be the starting
point for looking at a settlement. But since the parties know
that the FTC and a veritable swarm of plaintiff’s lawyers will
be picking the deal apart, having the imprimatur of experts
with a lot of initials after their names becomes a wise
investment.
Second, as we have noted earlier, any settlement
agreement involves some sort of consideration to the
defendant—whether in the form of foregone damages, express
monetary payment, or other benefit. Settlement, after all, is a
compromise—not total surrender. So does the Court’s adoption
of a rule of reason test in Actavis, broadly read, mean that
agreements entailing any consideration—short of an agreement
that simply allows the generic to enter before the underlying
patent expires—must be defended by showing that the value of
the consideration does not include a premium to the generic to
stay out of the market? That would be to resurrect the
presumption of illegality, which the Court decisively rejected.
No rational company provides services without making a profit.
Since there is no presumption of illegality, the burden is on the
challenger to show that there is a premium and that such
premium is not simply a fair profit in the transaction.
Finally, there is one really interesting potential train
wreck that seems to have been overlooked in the initial
analyses. The unexplained large payment (bad) and the fair
value for services (good), are rational individually, but a mess
when put together.
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A payment with no explanation invites argument that it
was for some malign purpose; here delayed generic entry.
Conversely, a payment that can be fully explained as
compensating the generic for real services (say, distributing
product) almost has to be legal. The alternative would be to
hold that once patent litigation is filed, the two parties cannot
do ordinary business together, which would be ludicrous.
This leads to the conundrum that the Court has left us. If
the business deal between the patentee and the potential
infringer is large enough, even if entirely defensible at fair
value, the profit on the side deal could be enough to convince
the generic to agree to a later entry date. But there is no
“payment” for delay at all.
Yet if you condemn a legitimate side deal simply because it
can generate legitimate business profits for the generic, there is
no stopping point, and all settlements that are anything other
than partial surrender by the patentee are illegal. Not even the
FTC argued that, being content to argue that a reverse
payment created a presumption of illegality, a position that the
Court unanimously rejected in Actavis.40
V. A RADICAL, YET CONSERVATIVE CLOSING THOUGHT
The Court’s decision raises many interesting topics for
later discussion. But let’s step back a bit first. Much of the
debate over reverse payment settlements in Hatch-Waxman
cases has simply assumed the inherent rightness of the current
statutory structure, specifically the 180 days of generic
exclusivity to the first filer. It has been an argument about
what should happen at the back end, when the patent cases
brought under the statute settle. But what if, instead of trying
to regulate the downstream outcomes, we look to change the
upstream motivations and pressures?
At the time the statute was passed, it was assumed that
the first filer would litigate its case to conclusion. But that
overlooked the fact that almost all patent cases settle. The
40. The dissent would have upheld the “scope of the patent” test. Actavis,
133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The majority ordered a full “rule
of reason” inquiry. Id. (majority opinion). There were no votes for the
presumption of illegality that the FTC sought. And if you cannot rely on “fair
value of deal” as a complete defense, we are then thrown back on strength of
the patent, which the Court did not want to get into and, one might say,
implicitly rejected as unworkable. See id. at 2234.
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intent of the 180-day exclusivity was to encourage challenges to
patents and to knock out weak patents. In fact, what it has
done is encourage a lot of patent challenges, even when the
challenger has almost no chance of winning.41 The structure
incentivizes long-shot challenges in the hopes of being boughtoff in settlement.42
The 180-day exclusivity is worth a lot more today than it
was when Hatch-Waxman was passed. In 1984, generic
substitution was permissible. Now it is mandatory in almost all
cases.43 So why don’t we make the first filer earn that reward
by either pursuing the case to conclusion or settling in a way
that does not block later filers? Scott Hemphill and Mark
Lemley have provided an elegant analysis for making just such
a change.44 As radical as it might seem at first glance, this is
really a very conservative approach. Rather than trying to
regulate how litigation is settled, it moves to the cause of what
troubles critics of the settlements.45
With all due respect to the consultants and litigators, this
may just be the way out of the swamp. If you shut off the water
flow at the entrance, you don’t need to keep trying to build
dams to regulate the exit.

41. See Smith & Gleklen, supra note 16, at 6.
42. Id.
43. Bernard & Tom, supra note 18, at 624. There is always an exception
for a doctor to indicate that the branded product should be dispensed, but the
extra time and effort involved, and the added cost to the patient, makes this a
relatively insignificant part of the market. Id. (citing a Novartis study
showing that generic substitution rates were between 83.8% for
commercial/group plans and 97.1% for Medicaid plans).
44. C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic
Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 985–88
(2011). We do not agree with all of their prescriptions and arguments, but we
do believe that the approach could work in the real world.
45. Following up on Hemphill and Lemley, there is also a need for
research into the actual business models of some generics companies. The
assumptions about generic drug company behavior that underlie many of the
arguments in the Hatch-Waxman settlement field may well be factually
incorrect. For example, Johnson & Johnson has been involved in patent
litigation for some time over a low dose oral contraceptive, Ortho Tri-Cyclen
Lo. After the first challenger launched at risk (which served to trigger the 180day exclusivity for the first filer) and was enjoined (which eliminated the
exclusivity entirely), Johnson & Johnson still had to defeat seven more
challengers to the patent. Since exclusivity was not involved, what did prompt
these serial challenges? I am indebted to counsel at Johnson & Johnson for the
information on this litigation.
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